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Abstract
We describe the formal specification and verification of an algorithm
for Interactive Consistency [12] based on the Oral Messages algorithm for
Byzantine Agreement [9]. We compare our treatment with that of Bevier
and Young [2,3], who presented a formal specification and verification for
a very similar algorithm. Unlike Bevier and Young, who observed that
"the invariant maintained in the recursive subcases of the algorithm is
significantly more complicated than is suggested by the published proof"
and who found its formal verification "a fairly difficult exercise in me-
chanical theorem proving," our treatment is very close to the previously
published analysis of the algorithm, and our formal specification and
verification are straightforward.
This example illustrates how delicate choices in the formulation of
a problem can have significant impact on the readability of its formal
specification and on the tractability of its formal verification.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Fault tolerant s);stems, such as those used in digital flight control, require a way
to ensure that the replicated processors all work on the same input values. For
example, each processor may sample different sensors (or the same sensor at different
times) and thereby obtain different estimates of some external value; these different
estimates need to be combined into a single consensus value that is the same for
all processors. By starting with the same inputs, all correctly working processors
should then compute the same outputs and faults can be masked using exact-match
majority voting.
The problem of deciding on a Single Consensus value can be broken into two
stages. In the first stage, the processors exchange their private data values among
themselves. At the end of this stage, each processor has a vector giving the data
values of all the other processors; if there are no faults, these vectors will be identi-
cal on all processors. The second stage may then comprise any data conditioning,
selection, or averaging algorithms whatever: provided all processors run the same al-
gorithms, and start with the same vectors, they will end up with the same consensus
values.
We are interested in the first stage of this process, and with ensuring that it
performs reliably in the presence of arbitrary faults. (The worst kinds of fault
are "asymmetrical" ones where a faulty processor communicates different values
to different processors, potentially causing nonfaulty processors to disagree among
themselves.) This problem of reaching agreement in the presence of faults was first
posed, named, and solved by Pease, Shostak, and Lamport in 1980 [12]. They named
the problem that of achieving "Interactive Consistency." In 1982, the same authors
developed their analysis further, and reformulated it as the "Byzantine Generals
Problem" [9]; they named a revised version of the algorithm from their earlier paper
the "Oral Messages" algorithm. The principal difference between the Interactive
Consistency and Byzantine Generals problems is that the former is concerned with
the reliable exchange of values among all the participants, whereas the latter is con-
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cerned with the reliable communication of a value from a distinguished participant
(called the "General") to all the others (who are called "lieutenants"). In practi-
cal applications, it is the Interactive Consistency formulation that is appropriate,
but the colorful metaphor of the Byzantine Generals has proved so memorable that
this formulation is better known; indeed, the whole field of algorithm design for
agreement in the presence of faults has become known as that of "Byzantine Agree-
ment," and the asymmetrical kind of fault mentioned earlier has become known as
a "Byzantine fault."
A problem related to Interactive Consistency is Byzantine fault-tolerant clock
synchronization [8]. In 1988, we formally verified the "Interactive Convergence"
algorithm for this problem [8, Algorithm CNV] and found that the published anal-
ysis of this algorithm was incorrect in a number of details [15, 16]. Our colleague
Shankar has formally verified the generalized clock synchronization paradigm of
Schneider [18] and similarly found a number of small errors [19,20]. In both cases,
the formal verification led to improved and simplified presentations of the infor-
mal justifications for the correctness of the algorithm concerned. We have often
wondered whether formal verification of the Oral Messages algorithm for Byzan-
tine Agreement would yield similar benefits, and have been curious to know how
difficult the formal verification of this algorithm would be, compared to the clock
synchronization algorithms.
In 1990, a formal verification of the Oral Messages Algorithm was published by
Bevier and Young [3] as part of the documentation of a more substantial exercise
in which they also verified the design of a circuit to perform the algorithm, and the
theorem that the fault-tolerance of the Oral Messages Algorithm is optimal among
its class of algorithms.
Bevier and Young described the algorithm as "quite difficult" and have indi-
cated elsewhere that development of its formal verification (using the Boyer-Moore
prover [4]) took them about a mont h. We found this surprising, since the published
journal proof for the correctness of the Oral Messages algorithm [9, page 390] is
short (less than a page) and straightforward. The time taken may be explained by
Bevier and Young's observation [3, page 1] that their machine-checked proof
"...elucidates several issues which are treated rather lightly in the pub-
lished version of the proof. In particular, the invariant maintained in
the recursive subcases of the algorithm is significantly more complicated
than is suggested by the published proof."
After careful study of Bevier and Young's presentation, however, we were unable to
persuade ourselves that their claim of suppressed complexity in the published journal
proof is justified. On the contrary, we continued to find the journal description and
proof more compelling than their formal presentation. In order to resolve our doubts,
we decided to undertake a separate formal verification using our EI-IDM system [17].
3Thereare relativelyfewexamplesof interestingor difficult verificationsunder-
takenby morethan onegroup,or usingmorethan onesystemfor formal specifica-
tion andverification.Bill Young'scomparisonof Z and Gypsy[24]andthe 12-way
comparisonreportedby JeannetteWing [23]areconcernedsolelywith specification.
RathermoreinterestingareDavidBasinandMatt Kaufmann'scomparisonof two
verificationsof the finite Ramseytheorem[1], and Bill Young'sduplication [25]of
our verification[15,16]of a clocksynchronizationalgorithm [8].
Onereasonfor thepaucityofcomparisonsusingsubstantialor difficult examples
is that only a handfulof verificationsystemsarecapableof undertakingsuchexam-
ples,and the developersand usersof thosesystemsare fully engagedin their own
linesof enquiry.Whentheycanbeperformed,however,suchcomparisonsarevery
useful,sincethey providetheonly reasonableway to compareclaimsfor "readabil-
ity" or "expressiveness"in specificationlanguages,and "power" or "effectiveness"
in verificationenvironments.
Comparativestudiescan be undertakenat severaldifferent levels: two dif-
ferent systemscan be usedto proof-checkthe sameverification (cf. the clock-
synchronizationexamplementionedabove);two differentverificationscanbe per-
formedfor the samespecification;two differentformalizationscanbedevelopedfor
thesamespecification(cfl thestudyreportedby JeannetteWing);or twocompletely
separateformal developmentscanbe performedfor a singleproblem. Different
lessonsarelikely to belearnedfrom thesedifferentlevelsof comparison:whenone
toolornotationis simplysubstitutedfor another,wemaylearnsomethingaboutthe
ability of the secondto duplicatethe resultsof the first on its "homeground," but
wewill not learnhowthe problemmighthavebeenapproachedifferentlyhadthe
secondtoolor notationbeenusedfrom thestart; andwhentwoindependentdevel-
opmentsareundertaken,wemaylearnmoreaboutthe problem-solvingapproaches
of the individualsconcernedthanaboutthe toolsemployed.
Theexperimentdescribedhereisof thelatter kind,andit maybe that the main
conclusionto be drawn concernsthe considerableimpact that apparentlysmall
changesin the formulationof a problemcanhaveon the tractability of its formal
verification.Onthe otherhand,this examplealsoinvitesspeculationon the benefi-
cial influencethat anexpressivespecificationlanguageandadirectapproachto proof
mayhavein the developmentof felicitousformulationsof interestingalgorithms.
Chapter 2
Informal Overview
In this section we briefly review the Interactive Consistency (IC) and Byzantine Gen-
erals (BG) problems, and the "Original" (OA) and Oral Messages (OM) algorithms
for solving them. We follow the presentations of Pease, Shostak, and Lamport [9,12]
very closely.
2.1 Interactive Consistency
Consider a set of n isolated processors, of which some may be faulty. It is not known
which processors are faulty, nor how many, nor what behavior may be exhibited by
faulty processors. Suppose also that each processor p has some private value vp
(such as its reading of some sensor). The problem is to devise an algorithm that will
allow each processor p to compute a vector Vp of values, in which, for each processor
r, Vp(r) is p's estimate of r's private value, satisfying the following conditions:
ICI: If processors p and q are nonfaulty, then they agree on the value ascribed to
any other processor r; that is: Vp(r) = V_(r).
IC2: If processors p and r are nonfaulty, then the value ascribed to r by p is indeed
r's private value; that is, Vp(r) = vT.
2.1.1 Oral Messages
There are many variations on the IC and BG problems that differ in the assumptions
made about interprocessor communications. For example, whether the processors
are fully connected, whether messages can be lost, and whether a faulty processor
can forge a message purporting to have come from another. The Oral Messages
assumptions are:
A l: Every message that is sent between nonfaulty processors is correctly delivered.
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A2: The receiver of a message knows who sent it.
Ag" The absence of a message can be detected.
An algorithm based on Oral Messages solves the IC problem under these as-
sumptions. The principal difficulty that must be overcome by such an algorithm is
that a faulty processor may send different values to different nonfaulty processors,
thereby complicating satisfaction of condition IC1. To overcome this, an algorithm
will use several "rounds" of message exchange during which processor p tells pro-
cessor q what value it received from processor r and so on. Of course, if processor
p is faulty, it may "lie" about the value it received from processor r. By making
sufficiently many rounds, an algorithm can defeat this threat.
2.1.2 The Original Algorithm
The original algorithm [12, page 230], which we will abbreviate as OA, is parame-
terized by n, the number of processors, and m (where n :> 3m + 1), the maximum
number of faulty processors. The following description of OA is taken verbatim
from [12, page 230] (except that we have changed V to v).
"Let P be the set of processors and v a set of values. For k _> 1, we
define a k-level scenario as a mapping from the set of nonempty strings
(possibly having repetitions) over P of length _< k + 1, to v. For a given
k-level scenario, a and string w = PxP2...Pr, 2 <_ r < k + 1, a(w) is
interpreted as the value P2 tells pl that P3 told P2 that p4 told P3.. •that pr
told pr-1 is p_'s private value. For a single-element string p, a(p) simply
designates p's private value vp. A k-level scenario thus summarizes the
outcome of a k-round exchange of information. (Note that if a faulty
processor lies about who gave it information, this is equivalent to lying
about a value it was given.) Note also that for a given subset of nonfaulty
processors, only certain mappings are possible scenarios; in particular,
since nonfaulty processors are always truthful in relaying information, a
scenario must satisfy
a(pqw) = a(qw)
for each nonfaulty processor q, arbitrary processor p, and string w.
"The messages a processor p receives in a scenario a are given by
the restriction ap of a to strings beginning with p. The procedure we
present now for arbitrary m > 0, n > 3m+ 1, is described in terms ofp's
computation for a given ap, of the element of the interactive-consistency
vector corresponding to each processor q (i.e., t_(q)). The computation
is as follows:
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1. If for some subset Q of P of size > (n + m)/2 and some value t,,
ap(pwq) = v for each string w over Q of length < m, p records _,.
2. Otherwise the algorithm for m- 1, n- 1 is recursively applied with
P replaced by P- {q), and ap by the mapping &p defined by
&p(pw) = ap(pwq)
for each string w of length _< m over P-{q}. If at least [(n + m)/2]
of the n - 1 elements in the vector obtained in the recursive call
agree, p records the common value; otherwise p records NIL.
Note that &p corresponds to the m-level subscenario of a in which q
is excluded and in which each processor's private value is the value it
obtains directly from q in a."
We expect that many readers will share our opinion that this description of
OA is a challenge to comprehension. The argument for its correctness [12, page
231] is similarly hard to follow. The original authors also may have considered the
presentation somewhat difficult=, for a coupie Of years after the original publication
they reformulated the problem, the algorithm, and the argument for its correctness.
The revised presentation was couched in the metaphor of "Byzantine Generals" and
is described in the next section.
2.2 Byzantine Generals
As mentioned earher, BG differs from IC in that there is a distinguished processor
called the General whose value is to be communicated to all other processors (called
lieutenants)) Again, there are n processors in total, of which some (possibly includ-
ing the General) may be faulty. The General has some "order" v and the problem
is to devise an algorithm that will allow each Lieutenant p to compute an estimate
vv of the General's order satisfying the following conditions:
BGI: If Lieutenants p and q are nonfaulty, then they agree on the value ascribed
to the General; that is vp = Vq.
BG2: If the General is nonfaulty, then every nonfauity lieutenant has the correct
order; that]_ up = v. _ ......
We have =renamed these c0ndi{ions BGi_and:BG2 to distinguish them from the
corresponding conditions of the IC case.
1Lamport, Shostak and Pease [9] often speak of the "Commanding General," and refer to the
others as the "lieutenant generals."
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The Oral Messages (OM) algorithm solves the BG problem under the same
assumptions as OA; it can be regarded as a substantial reformulation of OA, rather
than an independent algorithm. In order to distinguish the BG version of the
algorithm from the IC version to be introduced later, we denote them OMBG and
OMIC, respectively. The algorithm is characterized by the number of rounds to be
made: OMBG(m) is the instance of the algorithm that makes m + 1 rounds. The
following description is taken verbatim from [9, page 388]. Note that under the
Byzantine Generals metaphor, faulty processors are called "traitors," and nonfaulty
ones are "loyal." First we describe the simplest case, OMBG(0):
OMBG(0)
1. The General sends his value to every lieutenant.
2. Each lieutenant uses the value he receives from the General, or uses
the value retreat if he receives no value.
Now we can describe the general case.
OMBG(m), m > 0
1. The General sends his value to every lieutenant.
2. For each i, let v_ be the value Lieutenant i receives from the General,
or else be retreat if he receives no value. Lieutenant i acts as the
General in Algorithm OMBG(m - 1) to communicate the value v_
to each of the n - 2 other lieutenants.
3. For each i, and each j _ i, let vj be the value Lieutenant i received
from Lieutenant j in step (2) (using Algorithm OMBG(m- 1)), or
else retreat if he received no such value. Lieutenant i uses the value
majority(v1,..., Vn_l ).
2.2.1 The Correctness Argument
The argument for the correctness of OMBG is taken verbatim from [9, page 390]
Lemma 1 For any m and k, Algorithm OMBG(m) satisfies BG2 if
there are more than 2k + m participants and at most k traitors.
Proof: The proof is by induction on m. BG2 only specifies what
must happen if the General is loyal. Using A1, it is easy to see that the
trivial algorithm OMBG(0) works if the General is loyal, so the lemma
is true for m = 0. We now assume it is true for m - 1, m > 0, and prove
it for m.
In step (1), the loyal General sends a value v to all n - 1 lieutenants.
In step (2), each loyal lieutenant applies OMBG(m - 1) with n - 1 gen-
erals. Since by hypothesis n > 2k + m, we have n - 1 > 2k + (m- 1),
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so we can apply the induction hypothesis to conclude that every loyal
lieutenant gets vj = v for each loyal Lieutenant j. Since there are at
most k traitors, and n - 1 > 2k ÷ (m - 1) >_ 2k, a majority of the n - 1
lieutenants are loyal. Hence, each loyal lieutenant has vi = v for a ma-
jority of the n- 1 values i, so he obtains majority(v1,..., v_-l) = v in
step (3), proving BG2. []
Theorem 1 For any m, Algorithm OMBG(m) satisfies conditions BG1
and BG2 if there are more than 3m participants and at most m traitors.
Proof: The proof is by induction on m. If there are no traitors, then it is
easy to see that OMBG(0) satisfies BG1 and BG2. We therefore assume
that the theorem is true for OMBG(m - 1) and prove it for OMBG(m),
m>0.
We first consider the case in which the General is loyal. By taking
k equal to m in Lemma 1, we see that OMBG(m) satisfies BG2. BG1
follows from BG2 if the General is loyal, so we only need verify BG1 in
the case the General is a traitor.
There are at most m traitors, and the General is one of them, so at
most m- 1 of the lieutenants are traitors. Since there are more than 3m
generals, there are more than 3m - 1 lieutenants, and 3m- 1 > 3(m- 1).
We may therefore apply the induction hypothesis to conclude that
OMBG(m- 1) satisfies conditions BG1 and BG2. Hence, for each j, any
two loyal lieutenants get the same value for vj in step (3). (This follows
from BG2 if one Of the two lieutenants is Lieutenant j, and from BG1
otherwise). Hence, any two loyal lieutenants get the same vector of values
vl,..., v,_-l, and therefore obtain the same value majority(v1,..., v,,-1)
in step (3), proving BG1. D
Chapter 3
Bevier and Young's Verification
Bevier and Young [3] performed a formal specification and verification of the OMBG
Algorithm using the Boyer-Moore theorem prover [4]. Insofar as the restrictions of
the Boyer-Moore logic allow I, Bevier and Young's specification and verification fol-
lows the published version of Lamport, Shostak and Pease [9] very closely. Since
the problem of practical interest is IC rather than BG, they augment their descrip-
tion [3, Section 3.4] with the specification and verification with an additional step
that applies OMBG iteratively (with each process in turn taking the role of the
General), thereby extending it to a solution for IC.
Bevier and Young specify OMBG in terms of two mutually recursive functions,
vora* and voml*; the former is the main OMBG function, while the latter specifies
the iterative application over all lieutenants required in step (2) of the former. In
addition, the function yore0 specifies the base case OMBG(0). These functions are
reproduced in Figure 3.1 (taken from [3, Figure 5, page 7]). 2
Bevier and Young explain these functions as follows [3, pages 6,7]. Note that
the function (send v i j) denotes the value received when process i sends value v
to j.
"vom* is the top-level function which takes as arguments the number
m of rounds, the General's name g and value v, a list 1 of lieutenant
names, and the vector vec in which the message traffic is recorded.
It returns a vector in which each lieutenant's position is filled by that
lieutenant's view of the General's value. Arriving at this view requires
m - 1 rounds of communication (the call to the voml* function) com-
bined (pa±r'd) with the initial round in which the General distributes
1The Boyer-Moore logic is an untyped, unquantifled first-order logic resembling pure lisp.
2In order to satisfy the definitional principle of the Boyer-Moore system, the mutually recursive
pair yore* and voml* are encoded in the actual specification as a single function with a "flag"
argument to distinguish the two cases. This version is reproduced in Appendix A, Figure A.1.
10 Chapter 3. Bevier and Young's Verification
Definition
(vomO g v 1 vec)
(if (listp I)
(put (car I)
(send v g (car i))
(vomO g v (car I) vec))
vec)
Definition
(vom* m g V 1 vec) - "
(if (zerop m) - "
(vomO g v 1 voc)
(votelist .-
(pair (vomO g v 1 vec)
(voml* (subl m) i (vomO g v 1 vec) 1 vec)
i)))
Definition
(voml* m g-list vomO 1 vec)
(if (listp g-list)
(pair (vom* m (car g-list) (get (car g-list) vomO)
(delete (car g-list) i) vec)
(voml* m (cdr g-list) vomO 1 vec)
(delete (car g-list) I))
(init nil (length vec)))
Figure 3.1: Bevier and Young's Specification of the Oral Messages Algorithm
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his value directly (the call to vor,0), and voting on each element in the
resulting map (the call to votelist).
"The function voml* takes as arguments the number m of exchanges,
a list g-list of names of processes which will serve in turn as the general
in this round, a vector yore0 in which each process's slot is filled with its
value sent to it by the General, a list 1 of the other lieutenants, and a
vector vec in which the message traffic is recorded. It returns a vector
in which each lieutenant's name is bound to the list of messages that
lieutenant has received in this round of message exchanges."
Bevier and Young state that the verification that their specifications of OMBG
satisfy BG1 and BG2 is '% fairly difficult exercise in mechanical theorem prov-
ing" [3, page 1] but that they "gained considerable insight into the algorithm" from
their formalization [3, page 13]. They illustrate the latter point by referring to the
published proof of OMBG (reproduced in Section 2.2.1 above) and observing:
"Though seemingly straightforward, there is a considerable degree of
suppressed detail in this proof. In particular, the induction hypothesis
refers to what happens after each round of message exchange without
worrying about the intermediate states which occur during each round.
In terms of our mutually recursive version of the algorithm, the proof
above describes the induction by referring to what happens after each
call to vom* and simply assumes what happens in the calls to voml*.
"What happens in these calls, and what is crucial from the point of
view of a fully formal proof, is that there is a rather involved invariant
maintained by the algorithm. A key part of this invariant can be stated
roughly as follows: after each round of message exchange all of the non-
faulty processors agree on a value for the General, that value being the
General's actual value. This notion we call non-faulty agreement.
"Formulating and proving an appropriate version of the invariant for
BG2 was the primary effort in the proof."
The invariant referred to above is reproduced in Figure 3.2. Bevier and Young "do
not bother to describe some of the subsidiary concepts such as non-faulty-value
which are involved in the statement of the invariant" [3, page 14] and do not ex-
hibit the corresponding invariant for BG1, but note that it "is substantially more
involved."
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Theorem. VOM-IC2-INVARIANT
(implies
(and (setp 1)
(bounded-number-listp 1 (length vec))
(member i i)
(not (faulty i)))
(if flg
(implies
(and (not (member g i))
(not (faulty g))
(leq (plus (times 2 (fault-count i)) m)
(length i)))
(equal (get i (vom flg m g v 1 vec))
v))
(implies I _:
(and (subbagp g I)
(equal (length v) (length vec))
(lessp (plus (times 2 (fault-count I)) m)
(length I))
(non-faulty-agreement (non-faulty-value g v)
g v))
(not (lessp (occurrences
(non-faulty-value g v)
(get i (vom flg m g v 1 vec)))
(if (member i g)
(sub1 (good-count g))
(good-count g)))))))
Figure 3.2: Bevier and Young's "Invariant" for BG2
Chapter 4
Specification and Verification
in EHDM
One source of complexity in both the specification and verification of Bevier and
Young's formulation of OMBG is the need for a pair of mutually recursive functions.
An additional burden is the need to perform a second specification and verification
in order to connect BG to IC. Both of these difficulties can be avoided by developing
a version of OM that solves IC directly. One way to see that this approach is likely
to be beneficial is to observe that the iterated recursion inside OMBG is solving an
instance of IC: after the General has transmitted his value to all the lieutenants, each
of those lieutenants has a private value (the value he received from the General), and
the subgoal is for the n- 1 lieutenants to perform IC on those private values. Each
lieutenant will then have an IC vector that gives the value sent by the General to
each lieutenant; all nonfaulty lieutenants will have the same IC vector, and selecting
the majority value from those vectors will cause each of them to assign the same
value to the General.
It follows that a generalization of OMBG from BG to IC should be simpler than
OMBG, since the recursive subproblems will be the same as the parent. We will
call this generalization the OMIC algorithm. We present the algorithm and the
argument for its correctness in the next few pages. All the specifications that follow
in this section are taken directly from our formal verification, and are in the language
of EHDM [17]; the proof sketches are also taken from our formal verification. The
full specification and verification is presented in Appendix C.
We will specify OMIC as a function of three arguments: m the number of rounds,
v a vector giving the private values of each processor, and caucus the set of processors
participating in the algorithm. Processors are represented by natural numbers in
the range 0...n - 1, and vectors are functions from processors to values (of some
uninterpreted type T). OMIC will return a "vector" of vectors: that is a function
from processors to vectors. Thus OMIC(m,v, caucus)(p) will be the IC vector of
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processor p following the OMIC algorithm, and OMIC(m, v, caucus)(p)(q) will be
p's opinion of q's private value (i.e., of v(q)). Notice that we are using higher-order
functions (i.e., functions whose values are functions) here. We have found higher-
order constructions very convenient in several specifications that we have undertaken
(see for example [13]). 1
In preparation for formally specifying OMIC, we first state its behavior for the
case m = 0. In this and the formulas that follow, free variables are treated as uni-
versally quantified at the outermost level, and we do not generally identify the types
of the variables appearing in these formulas (see the full specification in Appendix C
for these subsidiary declarations).
OMIC(O, v, caucus)(p)(q)
= if p E caucus A q E caucus then send(v(q), q,p) else undef end if
Here, under is some arbitrary value and send(v(q), q, p) is, as in Bevier and Young's
formulation a function that represents the value received by p when q sends it the
value v(q). Our requirement on OMIC in the case m = 0 simply states that if p
and q are both participants to the algorithm (i.e., both in the set caucus), then p's
opinion of q's private value v(q) following the algorithm should be send(v(q),q,p).
The property assumed of send is captured in the following axiom
[ send_ax: Axiom ok(p) A ok(q) D send(t, q, p) = t [
where ok(p) is the predicate that asserts that processor p is nonfaulty. (We regard
a processor that is faulty at any point in the algorithm as being faulty throughout.)
Essentially, this axiom captures Assumption A1 of oral messages. Notice that if
either p or q are faulty, we know nothing whatever about the value send( t, q, p).
Well, not exactly nothing: we do know that its value is functionally determined by
t, p, and q. Thus' if q were to send t to p in a later round, the value received would
be the same as in this round, whatever the fault-status of the processors concerned.
This may not be realistic if p or q are faulty, so we will reformulate send to take the
round number as an argument: send(r, t, q,p)then represents the value received by
p when q sends it the value t in round r. The round number does not affect the
transmission when nonfaulty processors are involved:
[ send_ax: Axiom ok(p) A ok(q) D send(r, t, q, p) = t I
1Higher-order functions are also used in EHDMto specify set operations, which appear frequently
in this specification. Sets are specified as their characteristic predicates in EHDMand the operation
that, for example, removes a processor from a set of processors has the specification
caucus - {q}: function[set, processors ---*set] = (A caucus, q : caucus with [(q) := false])
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The only effectand purposeof this modifiedtreatmentof the send function is to
make it more clear that no assumptions at all are made about values communicated
when either the sender or receiver is faulty. 2
The specification of the behavior of OM1C in the case m = 0 needs to be adjusted
accommodate the changed functionality of send:
I OMIC(0, v, caucus)(p)(q) I= if p E caucus A q E caucus then send(O, v(q), q, p) else undef end if
For the case m = r, r > 0, we require that p's opinion of q's private value should
be send(r, v(q),q, q) if p = q,3 otherwise it should be the majority value in p's IC
vector, after performing OMIC with m = r - 1 on the current set of processors with
q excluded, and the values received from q as the private values. Thus we require
r > 0 D OMIC(r, v, caucus)(p)(q)
= if p E caucus A q E caucus
then if p = q
then send(r, v(q), q, q)
else maj(caucus - {q}, OMIC(r - 1, distr(r, v(q), q), caucus - {q})(p))
end if
else undef
end if
Here, distr(r, v(q),q) is simply a function that uses send in round r to distribute
the value v(q) from q to every other process: 4
[ distr: function[rounds, T, processors ---,vector] = ( A r, t, p: ( A z: send(r, t, p, z))) I
2Even the modified formulation of send is not free of the suggestion that the value delivered by
a faulty processor is functionally determined. The only way to completely remove this taint is to
use a relational specification for send, with the interpretation that send(t1, q, p, t2) is true if p could
possibly receive t2 when q sends it tl, and the axiom:
] send_ax: Axiom ok(p) A ok(q) D send(t, q, p, t)
The problem with this reformulation is that it has ramifications throughout the specification, re-
quiring the definition of the Oral Messages algorithm itself, as well as several subsidiary functions,
to become relations also. Our colleague Shankar has recently developed such a specification and
verification of OMIC, but here we prefer to stay with the simpler, if slightly flawed, functional
definition of send.
3We could specify v(q) in this case; we have chosen the weaker assumption that a faulty processor
may not even know its own value.
tit might be less "wasteful" to add the set of recipient processors (i.e., caucus-{q}) as an addi-
tional argument to distr, rather than have the value sent to every process. This sort of "economy"
would be important in an implementation of the algorithm, but would clutter the specification and
proof.
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The function maj takes a set caucus of processors, and a vector v, and computes the
majority value (if any) in that vector over that set. Actually, requiring this function
to be implemented by a majority vote overspecifies the problem. All that is really
required is specified in the following axiom, which states that if the good processors
form a majority in caucus, and if all the good processors have the same value in the
vector, then that is the value of the maj function. Notice that taking the median
of the values of the members of caucus (assuming they come from an ordered set)
would also satisfy this specification (as was correctly noted by Lamport, Shostak
and Pease [9, page 388]).
majax: Axiom
[caucus[ > 2 * [faulty_members(caucus)[ A (Vp: ok(p) Ap E caucus D v(p) = t)
D maj(caucus, v) = f
The function application faulty_members(caucus) that appears here is the set of
faulty (i.e., not ok) processors in the set caucus:
[ faulty.members: function[set _ set] = ( _ rnl: ( A z: z E rnl A _ok(z)))
I
Vertical bars denote the cardinality function. The only properties we require of this
function are captured in the following axioms.
[* 1]: function[set ---*nat]
non_empty_ax: Axiom (3p :p E ml) _ [rnl[ # 0
card_remove_ax: Axiom z E rnl D [rnl - {z}[ = Iml[- 1
A second requirement on the maj function is that its value depends on only
those elements of the vector corresponding to members of the set caucus.
!
(Vp: p E caucus D vl(p) = v2(p)) D maj(caucus, vl) = maj(caucus, v2) [maj_ext: Axiom
We now return to the specification of OMIC. The two behaviors that were stated
above (for the cases m = 0, and m > 0, respectively) could be specified as axioms
defining the function; we prefer, however, to specify the function definitionalIy and
to deduce those properties as (straightforward) lemmas. The advantage of the defi-
nitional specification is that the EHDM typechecker will guarantee its soundness (in
the sense of not introducing inconsistencies). To do this, we are required to exhibit
a measure function that takes the same arguments as OMIC and whose value is a
natural number that can be proved to decrease across recursive calls. In the present
case, we use the measure function terminates that simply returns its first argument
(i.e., the number of rounds). The final specification for OMIC is given in Figure 4.1.
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terminates:function[rounds,vector,set_ nat] = ( Ar, v, caucus---* nat: r)
OMIC: Recurslve function[rounds, vector, set _ function[processors _ vector]] =
( A r, v, caucus :
if r=0
then ( Ap :
(Aq:
if p E caucus A q E caucus
then send(v, v(q),q,p)
else undef
end if))
else ( _ p :
(Aq:
if p E caucus A q E caucus
then if p = q
then send(r, v(q),q,q)
else maj(caucus - {q},
end if)
by terminates
OMIC(r - 1, distr(r, v(q), q), caucus - {q})(p))
end if
else undef
end if))
Figure 4.1: Our specification of the Oral Messages Algorithm
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We invite the reader to compare this specification with that of Bevier and Young
that was shown in Figure 3.1. Since our specification is pretty-printed (a function
performed automatically by EHDM), while Bevier and Young's is given in raw text
form, the versions shown in Appendix A, which reproduce the exact text submitted
to their respective theorem proving environments, allow more exact comparison.
The Interactive Consistency conditions IC1 and IC2 are easily stated as theorems
to be proven:
Cl_final: Theorem
ok(p) A ok(q) D OMIC(m, v, fullset)(p)(y) = OMIC(m, v, fullset)(q)(y)
C2_final: Theorem ok(p) A ok(q) D OMIC(m, v, fullset)(p)(q) = v(q)
where fullset is the set of all processors.
As in the informal proof of Section 2.2.1, we begin by proving a lemma similar
to IC2. The proof is by induction and in formal verifications it is usually convenient
to reformulate the theorem to be proved as a predicate on the induction variable.
Here, we call the predicate C2prop.
C/prop: function[rounds ---*bool] =
(A r : (V p, q, caucus, v :
ok(v) A ok(q)
A p E caucus A q E caucus
^ [caucus[ > 2 • [faulty_members(caucus)[ + r
D OMIC(r, v, caucus)(p)(q) = v(q)))
The base case of the induction (i.e., C2prop(O)) follows by straightforward apph-
cation of definitions; the inductive step (i.e., r < m A C2prop(r) D C2prop(r + 1))
follows from two lemmas. The first, which asserts that a good processor has the
correct opinion of its own value, is straightforward:
[ ok_self: Lemma ok(y) A y • caucus D OMIC(r, v2, caucus)(y)(y) = v_(y) l
!
The second, which asserts that under certain conditions a good processor forms the
correct opinion of the private value of another good processor, is more complex.
ok_others: Lemma
r < m A ]caucus -- {q}l > 2 * [faulty_members(caucus - {q})]
A ok(y) A ok(q)
A y • caucus A q E caucus
Ay#q
^ (V z, vl : z _ caucus ^ ok(z) A z # q
D OMIC(r, Vl,Caucus - {q})(y)(z) = vl(z))
D OiIC(r + 1, v2, caucus)(y)(q) = v2(q)
19
Verification of this property depends on the majax axiom of the maj function.
The two lemmas above are sufficient to establish the inductive step for verifi-
cation of C2prop(r); observe that the hypothesis to the inductive step discharges
the quantified subexpression in ok_others. The theorem C2_final follows straightfor-
wardly from C2prop(r) by substitution of m for r and fullset for caucus, and using
the axiom
fullset_card_ax: Axiom Ifullsetl = n A Ifaulty-members(fullset)l _<m
and the constraint that less than a third of the processors may be faulty:
mn_prop: Formula 3 * m < n
This property is stated as a formula in the assuming section of the EHDM module
that specifies the theory developed here. It specifies an assumption on the param-
eters m and n to the module: inside the module, this assumption is treated as an
axiom; it must be discharged whenever the module is instantiated.
IC1 is similarly proved by induction, using the following predicate.
Clprop: function[rounds ---*bool] =
( _ r : ( Vp, q, y, caucus, v :
ok(p) A ok(q)
A p E caucus A q E caucus A y E caucus
A [caucus[ > 3 * r A r > [faulty_members(caucus)[
D OMIC(r, v, caucus)(p)(y) -- OMIC(r, v, caucus)(q)(y)))
Again the base case is straightforward; the inductive step has two cases, depending
on whether the processor y is faulty or not. The case that it is faulty is dealt with
in the following lemma, whose proof is a consequence of the maj_ezt axiom of the
maj function.
agree_nok: Lemma
r < m A [caucusl > 3 * (r + 1) A r 42 i> [faulty_members(caucus)l
A ok(p) A ok(q)
A p E caucus A q E caucus A y E caucus
^  ok(y)
^ (v z, vl : z caucus- {v}
D OMIC(r, Vl,Caucus - {y})(p)(z) = OMIC(r, vl,caucus - {y))(q)(z))
D OMIC(r + 1, v2, caucus)(p)(y) = OMIC(r + 1, v2, caucus)(q)(y)
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The case when y is nonfaulty is treated in the following lemma
agree_ok: Lemma
r < m A ]caucus[ > 3 * (r + 1) A r + 1 > ]faulty_members(caucus)]
^ ok(p) ^ ok(q)
A p E caucus A q E caucus A y E caucus
A ok(y)
D OMIC(r + 1, v2, caucus)(p)(y) = OMIC(r + 1, v2, caucus)(q)(y)
whose proof is a consequence of C2_final.
These two lemmas are sufficient to establish the inductive step for Cl_final;
note that the hypothesis to this step discharges the quantified subexpression in
agree_nok. Cl_final follows from Clprop(r) in the same way that C2_final follows
from C2prop(r).
The full specification and verification requires development of some "background
knowledge." For example, the inductions require a specialized induction scheme that
goes from 0 only as far as m. This is stated as the Lemma round_induct th_.t is
ultimately derived from an axiom for Noetherian induction contained in a standard
EHDM library module. The variable round_prop is some arbitrary property of rounds
that is to be shown to hold for all rounds.
round_prop: Var function[rounds _ bool]
round_induct: Lemma
(round_prop(0) A (V r:r < m A round_prop(v) D round_prop(r + 1)))
D round_prop(s)
A full listing of the forma_ specification is provided in Appendix C, together
with EHDM's "proof chain" analysis for Cl_final. The latter identifies the axiomatic
foundation for our development: this comprises the 6 axioms and the assumption
shown here, plus an axiom for induction and another for function extensionality
that come from library modules. The subsidiary lemmas required to carry out the
formal verification number 23 (plus the two theorems), with another 4 in library
modules, and a further 20 typecheck correctness conditions (wccs--these are proof
obligations that must be discharged to ensure type-correctness) that are generated
by the typechecker. Only 2 of the TCCs require user-generated proofs; the other 18
are proved automatically.
Chapter 5
Discussion and Conclusion
5.1 Discussion
We have presented the formal specification and verification of an algorithm for In-
teractive Consistency derived from the Oral Messages algorithm for the Byzantine
Generals Problem. Bo_h the specification of the algorithm and the arguments for
its correctness are straightforward and closely modeled on those given by Lamport,
Shostak and Pease in their journal presentation [9]. Development of the formal spec-
ification and its verification in EHDM took about four days. By comparison, Bevier
and Young [3], using the Boyer-Moore theorem prover, found formal verification of
their version of the algorithm "a fairly difficult exercise in mechanical theorem prov-
ing" that occupied them for about a month. We do not know all the complexities
that confronted Bevier and Young, and so we cannot identify, much less apportion
credit to, all the reasons why we apparently found the verification easier than them.
However, one explanation for these different assessments of the difficulty of the
exercise may lie in the different formulations employed for the algorithm. Bevier and
Young used the Byzantine Generals formulation, which must be applied iteratively
in order to solve the Interactive Consistency problem that is the topic of real interest,
and whose recursive subcase likewise requires iteration. This potentially complicates
the inductions at the heart of the proof (since the recursive subcase is not simply
a smaller instance of the original problem), and the larger verification along with
it. The specification of the algorithm may become similarly complicated in this
formulation. In contrast, our reformulation of the Oral Messages algorithm solves
the Interactive Consistency problem directly, and its recursive subcase is a smaller
instance of itself. The formal specification, main inductions, and overall verification
are then entirely straightforward.
The lesson here is a variation on the well-known observation that it is sometimes
easier to prove a stronger than a weaker theorem when using induction. In partic-
ular, it is much easier to prove properties of an algorithm whose recursive subcases
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are exact replicas of itself: and it may be worth modifying the algorithm, or its
requirement, or both, in order to make this so. A related observation, one that we
first heard explicitly articulated by our colleague Shankar, is that recursions should
always be formulated so that the base case is completely different from the recursive
case--since otherwise one may end up verifying substantially the same argument
twice.
But our simpler verification cannot be entirely attributed to our reformulation
of the Oral Messages algorithm into the IC form, for we have also verified the BG
version of the algorithm as considered by Bevier and Young. Our specification
of the BG form is not exactly the same as theirs, since our richer specification
language allows us to specify the algorithm without the need to simulate a pair of
mutually recursive functions (see Appendix B). Nonetheless, our BG formulation is
substantially the same as Bevier and Young's and yet its verification is only a little
more complex than that of OMIC. 1 However, we must admit that the formulation
and verification of the BG version would have been significantly more difficult had
we not already performed the IC version; that is specification and verification of IC
followed by BG is probably much simpler than tackling BG alone.
But allowing for the advantage we gained by choosing the more tractable ap-
proach, we still seem to have found this exercise more straightforward that Bevier
and Young, and we attribute some of this to the design decisions embodied in EHDM.
The specification language of EttDM is intended to provide a fairly direct and natural
means for expressing a variety of mathematical concepts, while retaining a straight-
forward logical foundation. We were gratified to find that the language helped us
to achieve clear descriptions of these tricky algorithms. We find the strong type
system and higher-order capabilities particularly helpful in this regard. Identify-
ing the types of the variables and functions involved is a valuable first step in the
formulating the specification, since it su_ests the ways in which functions should
be combined and thereby' in this Case, helps determine the shape of the recursion.
Higher-order logic allows many ideas to be expressed is a direct manner: thus, we do
not require the mutual recursion that complicates Bevier and Young's specification,
and we can represent values as functions, without the need to introduce lists.
We have had similar experiences with other specifications that we have under-
taken. For example, our formal development in EHDM of a model for fault-masking
and transient-recovery in digital flight-control systems [13, 14] was undertaken in
parallel with a similarly detailed development using conventional pencil-and-paper
mathematical notation [5,6]. The EItDM version took no longer to develop than the
other, is more general, is equally readable, and has been fully verified.
The simplifying reformulation of the Oral Messages Algorithm into its IC form
is very much the kind of benefit that we strive to obtain from formal methods (see,
1The verification, which is available from the author on request, was obtained by modifying the
OMIC version, and took about a man-day to produce.
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for example, our improved argument for the correctness of the Interactive Conver-
gence clock synchronization algorithm [15,16]). We are strongly of the opinion that
formal methods must contribute to, and cannot stand apart from, established and
informal practices in software and hardware engineering. Thus, specifications must
be readable by others than their authors, and formal verifications must yield a chain
of argument that can be presented to, and will convince, a suitably knowledgeable
human reviewer.
5.2 Conclusion
As with other formal developments that we have performed, we derived a significant
benefit from this exercise quite apart from the mechanically-checked verification of
an interesting argument. Here, the benefit was a reformulation of the Oral Messages
Algorithm to solve the Interactive Consistency, rather than the Byzantine Generals
problem. This is not only a more useful form of the algorithm in practice, it is rather
simpler to specify and to verify. As always, this benefit could have been obtained
without formalization, but it was the discipline of formalization that led us to focus
on the problem in the manner required.
The simplification produced by our reformulation can be gauged by comparing
our formal specification and verification with that of Bevier and Young. Bevier and
Young state [3, page 1]
• "We believe that our formtilation provides a very clear and unam-
biguous characterization of the algorithm.
• "Our machine checked proof elucidates several issues which are
treated rather lightly in the published version of the proof. In par-
ticular, the invariant maintained in the recursive subcases of the
algorithm is significantly more complicated than is suggested by
the published proof.
"The latter two advantages arise as a consequence of providing a fully
formal proof, whether machine checked or not. However, the use of a
powerful mechanical theorem prover as a checker is a boon in managing
the complexity of the formal proof."
Regarding the first of these claims, we believe that our formulation is rather clearer
and simpler (and more useful) than Bevier and Young's, but that may be a matter
of taste. We believe we have demonstrated that their second claim is mistaken: our
machine-checked proof is essentially the same as the published version of the proof,
and we think it likely that the complexity discovered by Bevier and Young was an
artifact of their formalization and of the theorem prover at their disposal. Rather
than agreeing that "a powerful mechanical theorem prover.., is a boon in managing
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the complexity of the formal proof," we believe that a mechanical theorem prover
should help the user develop reasonably clear and straightforward proofs.
In summary, we believe this small example provides some substantiation for our
belief that the benefits of formal specification and verification are best assisted by
rather rich specification languages that permit natural forms of expression, and by
approaches to theorem proving that permit fairly direct control by the user.
Finally, recall that in the Introduction, we stated that our other motivations
for undertaking this work were to see whether we derived benefits similar to those
obtained in earlier formal verifications that we had undertaken (e.g, discovery of
flaws in previous proofs), and to compare the difficulty of verifying of an algorithm
for interactive consistency with that of one for clock synchronization.
Unlike our experience with clock synchronization algorithms, the benefits we
derived from formal verification of OMIC did not include discovery of flaws in the
previously published proof of correctness of the algorithm. However, building on
the experience gained in the exercise described here, we have discovered an error
in the algorithm (not just the proof) of Thambidurai and Park [21] for Interactive
Consistency under a hybrid fault model; working with Patrick Lincoln, we have also
developed and formally verified a correct algorithm for this problem.
Regarding difficulty, we can report that we found verification of OMIC to be an
order of magnitude simpler than that of Interactive Convergence [15, t6]: four days
work compared to about 40, and 23 subsidiary lemmas compared with nearly 200.
Given its relatively small size, but rather interesting character, we invite others to
try formal specification and verification of the Oral Messages Algorithm using their
favorite verification system. We have used the Byzantine Generals formulation of
this algorithm as one of the test cases in the development of our new Prototype
Verification System, PVS [11]. Using PVS, we are now able to construct the main
proofs for correctness of OMBG in under an hour. For those more interested in
fault-tolerant algorithms than the performance-testing 0f verification systems, an
interesting challenge is to develop and formally verify some of the many variants
that have been proposed for the Oral Messages Algorithm. We, for example, have
investigated the algorithm of Thambidurai and Park as already mentioned, and have
also formally verified a generalization of the algorithm used to provide Interactive
Consistency in the Draper FTP architecture [7].
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Appendix A
The "Real" Specifications
In this Appendix we reproduce the "real" specifications of the algorithms employed
by Bevier and Young and by ourselves. Bevier and Young's specification differs
from that of Figure 3.1 by combining the pair of mutually recursive functions into
a single function with a "flag" argument; our specification is the same as that given
on page 17, but is reproduced here in its raw text form.
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Definition
(vom flg m g v 1 vec)
(if flg
(if (zerop m)
(vomO g v 1 vec)
(votelist
(pair (vomO g v 1 vec)
(vom f (subl m) 1 (vomO g v 1 vec) 1 vec)
i)))
(if (listp g-list)
(pair (vom t m (car g) (get (car g) vomO)
(delete (car g) i) vec)
(vom f m (cdr g) v 1 vec)
(delete (car g) i))
(init nil (length vec))))
Figure A.I: Bevier and Young's Specification--The Rea/Version
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OMIC: RECURSIVE function[rounds, vector, set
-> function[processors -> vector]] =
(LAMBDA r, v, caucus :
IFr=O
THEN (LAMBDA p :
(LAMBDA q :
IF member(p, caucus) AND member(q, caucus)
THEN send(r, v(q), q, p) ELSE under END IF))
ELSE (LAMBDA p :
(LAMBDA q :
IF member(p, caucus) AND member(q, caucus)
THEN IF p = q
THEN send(r, v(q), q, q)
ELSE maj(remove(caucus, q),
0MIC(r - I, distr(r, v(q), q),
remove(caucus, q))(p))
END IF
ELSE undef
END IF))
END IF)
BY terminates
Figure A.2: Our Specification--The Raw Text Version
Appendix B
The Byzantine Generals
Formulation of the Algorithm
We specify the Byzantine Generals formulation of the Oral Messages algorithm as
a function OMBG of four arguments: G the identity of the General, m the number
of rounds, t the value the General wishes to communicate, and caucus, the set of
participants (which includes the General). OMBG will return a vector of values
in which OMBG(G, m, t, caucus)(p) is lieutenant p's opinion of the General's value.
The correctness conditions are the following.
BGl_finah Theorem ok(p) A ok(q)
D OMBG(G, rn, t, fullset)(p) = OMBG(G, m, t, fullset)(q)
SG2_final: Theorem ok(p) A ok(G) D OMBG(G, m, t, fullset)(p) = t
The specification of OMBG is rather interesting; it is due to our colleague Shankar.
In the case r = 0, lieutenant p's component of the vector returned is simply the value
received by p from the General; in the case r > 0, lieutenant p's component of the
vector is the value the General receives from himself when p = G, otherwise it is the
result of applying the maj function to the vector of values that p obtains when each
of the lieutenants in the caucus (less G but including p himself) acts as the General
in the OMBG algorithm with r - 1 rounds to distribute the value received by that
lieutenant from the original General. Notice how the higher-order capabilities of
the EttDM specification language allow us to specify the inner, iterative application
of OMBG by means of a A-abstraction, thereby avoiding the mutually recursive
functions of Bevier and Young's specification.
The formal verification of OMBG is very similar to that of OMIC, and was
derived from that of OMIC in less than a day. It is available from the author on
request.
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terminatesBG: function[processors, rounds, T, set _ nat] --
( A p, r, t, caucus ---*nat : r)
OMBG: Recursive function[processors, rounds, T, set --, vector] =
( A G, r, t, caucus :
if r=0
then ( A p : if caucus(p) A caucus(G)
then send(r, t, G,p)
else undef
end if)
else ( A p: if caucus(p) A caucus(G)
then if p = G
then send(r, t, G, G)
else maj(caucus- {G},
( A q : OMBG(q, r - 1, send(r, t, G, q), caucus - {G})(p)))
end if
else undef
end if)
end if) by terminatesBG
± : f:
= = =Y_5
Figure B.I: Our Formulation of the Byzantine Generals Version of the Algorithm
i i )
Appendix C
The Full Specification and
Verification
The specification text and verification output that follow were processed by EHDM
Version 5.2; some minor changes to the input syntax (e.g., deletion of the PROOF
keyword) will be necessary in order to use the current version of EHDM (numbered
6.1.1).
C.1 The Specification
We reproduce here the text of our specification and verification for the IC version
of the OM algorithm. The text comprises the module consensus. In the inter-
ests of brevity, we do not reproduce the system-generated module consensus_tcc
that contains the "typecheck-consistency conditions" (TCCs), nor the module top
that gives their proofs. Neither do we reproduce the library modules noetherian,
induction and functionprops. The module noetherian specifies the axiom of
Noetherian Induction (see, for example [15, page 99], [13, page 62] or [17, pages
57-61]), and the module induction (see, for example [13, page 63]) derives some
more specialized induction schemes from that general formulation. One of these
is used to prove the round_induct induction scheme over rounds that is employed
here. The functionprops module (see, for example [15, page 99]) simply _spe_ifies
an axiom of function extensionality.
C.1.1 Module "Consensus"
This module contains the specification and verification of the OMIC algorithm. Cer-
tain subsidiary concepts, such as sets and cardinality are defined here, too. Normally
these concepts are imported from library modules (see, for example [13, page 66]),
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but so few of their properties are needed here that we have preferred to specify them
in line.
consensus: Module [m, n: nat]
Exporting all
Assuming
ran_prop: Formula 3 * m < n
Theory
x: Var nat
processors: Type from nat with (A x : x < n)
rounds: Type from nat with ( A z : x _< m)
T: Type
vector: Type is function[processors --* T]
r, s: Var rounds
v, vl, v2: Var vector
p, q, y, z: Var processors
undef: T
t: Var T
set: Type is function[processors --* bool]
fullset: set == (A z : true)
ok: function[processors ---*bool]
caucus, rrtl_ D22: Vat set
p E ml: function[processors, set --* bool] == ( A p, ml : rnl (p))
faulty_members: function[set --* set] = ( A rnl: ( A z: z E ml A -_ok(z)))
• 1 - {.2}: function[set, processors --_ set] --=
( A caucus, q: caucus with [(q) :-- false])
[. 1[: function[set _ nat]
non_empty_ax: Axiom (3p:p E rnl) ¢:_ ]rnl] _ 0
fullset_card_ax: Axiom [fullset[ = n A [faulty_members(fullset)[ < m
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all_ok: Lemma 0 = [faulty-members(caucus)] A p E caucus D ok(p)
card_remove_ax: Axiom z E rnl D Ira1 -- {z}l = Imll- l
faulty_members_card_remove-ok: Lemma
z e ml ^ ok(z) _ Ifaulty-members(ml - {z))l = Ifaulty-members(ml)l
faulty_members_card_remove-nok: Lemma
z E ml A -,ok(z) D IfaultyAnembers(ml - {z})l = Ifaulty-members(ml)l- 1
maj: function[set, vector _ 71]
majax: Axiom Icaucusl> 2 • Ifaulty-members(caucus)I
^ (v p: ok(p)^ v e caucns_ v(v)= _)
D maj(caucus, v) = t
maj_ext: Axiom (Vp: p E caucus D vl(p) = v2(p))
D maj(caucus, vl) = maj(caucus, v__)
send: function[rounds, T, processors, processors ---* 71]
send_ax: Axiom ok(p) A ok(q) D send(r, t, q,p) = t
distr: function[rounds, T, processors ---, vector] ==
(_ r,t,p: (_ z: send(r,t,V,z)))
terminates: function[rounds, vector, set _ nat] == ( I r, v, caucus --_ nat : r)
OMIC: Recursive function[rounds, vector, set --* function[processors --* vector]]
= (A r,v, caucus :
ifr =0
then (Ap:(Aq:
if p E caucus A q E caucus then send(r, v(q), q, p) else undef end if))
else (Ap : (A q :
if p E caucus A q E caucus
then if p = q
then send(r, v(q), q, q)
else maj(caucus - {q},
OMIC(r - 1, distr(r, v(q), q), caucus - {q})(p))
end if
else undef
end if))
end if) by terminates
Cl_final: Theorem ok(p) A ok(q)
D OMIC(rn, v, fullset)(p)(y) : OMIC(m, v, fuilset)(q)(y)
C2_finah Theorem ok(p) A ok(q) D OMIC(m, v, fullset)(p)(q) = v(q)
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Clprop: function]rounds _ bool] =
(A r : (V p, q,y, caucus, v :
ok(p) A ok(q) A p E caucus
A q E caucus
^ y _ caucus A Icaucusl > 3 * r A r >_ [faulty_members(caucus)[
D OMIC(r, v, caucus)(p)(y) = OMIC(r, v, caucus)(q)(y)))
C2prop: function]rounds ---*bool] =
( A r : ( V p, q, caucus, v :
ok(p) A ok(q) A p e caucus
A q E caucus A ]caucus[ > 2 * ]faulty.znembers(caucus)] + r
D OMIC(r, v, caucus)(p)(q) = v(q)))
CI: Lemma Clprop(r)
C2: Lemma C2prop(r)
Proof
Using induction, functionprops[processors, bool]
i: Var nat
round_prop: Var function]rounds --* bool]
round_induct: Lemma (round_prop(0)
A (V r:r < m ^ round_prop(r) _ round_prop@ + 1)))
D round_prop(s)
round_induct_proof: Prove
round_induct {r _ if i@pl in rounds then i@pl else 0 end if} from
limitedinduction
{m 0,
rn 1 _ /71_
p ,-- ( _ i : if i in rounds then round_prop(i) else false end if),
n _--- 8}
distr_prop: Lemma ok(p) A ok(q) D distr(r, v(p), p)(q) = v(p)
distr_prop_proof: Prove distr_prop from
send_ax {t ,-- v(p), p *---q, q _-- p}
OMO_prop: Lemma OMIC(O, v, caucus)(p)(q)
-- if p E caucus A q E caucus then send(O, v(q), q, p) else undef end if
OM0_prop_proof: Prove OM0_prop from OMIC {r _ 0}
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OM_prop: Lemma r > 0 D OMIC(r, v, caucus)(p)(q)
= if p E caucus h q E caucus
then if p = q
then send(r, v(q), q, q)
else maj(caucus - {q}, OMIC(r - 1, distr(r, v(q), q), caucus - {q})(p))
end if
else undef
end if
OM_prop_proof: Prove OM_prop from OMIC
OMO_ok: Lemma ok(p) A ok(q) A p E caucus A q E caucus
D OMIC(0, v, caucus)(p)(q) = v(q)
OM0_ok_proof: Prove OM0_ok from OM0_prop, send_ax {r _ 0, t +-- v(q@c)}
ok_self: Lemma ok(y) A y E caucus D OMIC(r, v2, caucus)(y)(y) = v2(y)
ok_self_proof: Prove ok_self from
OM_prop {v _ v2, p ,--- y, q ,-- y},
OM0_prop {v +-- v2, p +- y, q _ y},
send_ax {p 4-- y, q _ y, t +- v2(y)}
remove_ok_member: Lemma
z E ml A ok(z) D (p E faulty_members(m1 - {z}) ¢* p E faulty_members(m1))
remove_ok_member_proof: Prove remove_ok_member from
faulty_members {z _ p}, faulty_members {m, _ rnl - {z}, z _- p}
remove_ok: Lemma z E ml A ok(z) D faulty_members(m1 - {z}) = faulty_members(m1)
remove_ok_proof: Prove remove_ok from
remove_ok_member {p +-- a@p2},
extensionality {F <---faulty_members(m1), G -- faulty_members(m_ - {z})}
remove_nok_rnember: Lemma
z E ml A -_ok(z) D (p E faulty_members(m1 - {z}) ¢* p E faulty_members(m1) - {z})
remove_nok_member_proof: Prove remove_nok_member from
faulty_members {z +- p}, faulty_members {rnt _ rnl - {z}, z *-- p}
remove_nok: Lemma z E ml A-,ok(z)
D faulty_members(m, - {z}) = faulty_members(m1) - {z}
remove_nok_proof: Prove remove_nok from
remove_nok_member {p _ a@p2},
extensionality {F _ faulty_members(ml) - {z}, G _ faulty_members(m1 - {z})}
faulty_members_card_remove_ok_proof: Prove faulty_members_card_remove_ok from
remove_ok
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faulty_members_card_remove_nok_proof: Prove faulty.znembers_card_remove.nok from
remove_nok, faulty_members, card_remove_ax {ml _ faulty_members(ml@c)}
ok_card_remove; Lemma
r < m A q E caucus A ok(q)
D [caucus] > 2 * [faulty_members(caucus)[ + r + 1
D [caucus - {q}] > 2 * [faulty.members(caucus - {q})] + r
ok_card_remove_proof: Prove ok_card_remove from
card_remove_ax {ml *-- caucus, z _-- q},
faulty_members_card_remove_ok {ml *-- caucus, z *- q}
ok_others: Lemma r < m
A ]caucus - {q}] > 2 * ]faulty.znembers(caucus - {q})]
A ok(y) A ok(q)
A y E caucus
A q E caucus
Ay¢q
A(Vz, vl :
z E caucus A ok(z) A z :fi q
D OMIC(r, vl, caucus - {q})(y)(z) = Vl(Z))
D OMIC(r + 1, v2, caucus)(y)(q) = v2(q)
next_round: function[rounds _ rounds] ==
(Ar---*rounds: ifr<m thenr+l else 0 end if)
ok_others_proof: Prove
ok_others {z *---p@pl, vl _-- distr(next_round(r), v2(q), q)} from
majax
{caucus _ caucus - {q},
v +-- OMIC(r, distr(next_round(r), v2(q), q), caucus - {q})(y),
t *-- v2(q)},
OM_prop {r _- next_round(r), v _-- v2, p _- y},
distr_prop {r _- next_round(r), v _-- v2, p _- q, q _- y},
distr_prop {r _-- next_round(r), v 4-- v2, p _- q, q _" q},
distr_prop {r _- next_round(r), v _-- v2, p _- q, q _-" p@pl}
C2prop_0: Lemma C2prop(0)
C2prop_0_proof: Prove C2prop_0 from
C2prop {r _ 0},
OM0_ok {p _ p@pl, q _ q@pl, v _ v@pl, caucus _ caucus@pl}
C2prop_r: Lemma v < rn A C2prop(r) D C2prop(r + 1)
remove_others: Lemma p E caucus A p _ q D p E caucus - {q}
remove_others_proof: Prove remove_others
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C2prop_r_proof: Prove C2prop_r from
C2prop
{v *-- vl@P3,
q _ z@p3,
p *---p@p2,
caucus _ caucus@p2 - {q@p2}},
C2prop {r _-- next_round(r)},
ok_others
{q .-- q@p2,
y _ p@p2,
v2 _'- v@p2,
caucus *--- caucus@p2},
ok_self
{r _- next_round(r),
y _ p@p2,
v2 _-- v@p2,
caucus _ caucus@p2},
ok_card_remove {caucus _ caucus@p2, q _ q@p2},
remove_others {caucus _ caucus@p2, q *--- q@p2, p _ p@p2},
remove_others {caucus ,--- caucus@p2, q _-- q@p2, p _ z@p3}
C2_proof: Prove C2 from
round_induct {round_prop ,--- C2prop, s _ r},
C2prop_0,
C2prop._r {r _-- r@pl}
agree_nok: Lemma r < m
^ Icaucusl > 3 * (r + 1)
A r + 1 _> ]faulty_members(caucus)]
A ok(p) A ok(q)
A p E caucus
^ q E caucus
A y E caucus
^ -,ok(y)
A (Vz, vl :
z E caucus - {y}
OMit(r, vl, caucus- {v})(p)(z)
= OMIC(r, vl, caucus - {y})(q)(z))
D OMIC(r + 1, v2, caucus)(p)(y) = OMIC(r + 1, v2, caucus)(q)(y)
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agree_nok_proof: Prove
agree_nok {z _ p@p3, vl _- distr(next_round(r), v2(y), y)} from
OM_prop (r _ next_round(r), v _ v2, q _ y},
OM_prop (r _-- next_round(r), v *- v2, q *-- y, p _'- q},
maj_ext
{caucus .- caucus- {y},
vl +- OMIC(r, distr(next_round(r), v2(y), y), caucus - {Y})(P),
v2 _ OMIC(r, distr(next_round(r), v2(y), Y), caucus - {y})(q)},
distr_prop {r *-- next_round(r), v ,-- v2, p +- y},
distr_prop {r _-- next_round(r), v *- v2, p _- Y, q *-- Y},
distr_prop {r _-- next_round(r), v +- v2, p _-- y, q +- p@pl }
agree_ok: Lemma r < m
^ Icaucusl> a • (r + 1)
A r + 1 > Ifaulty-members(caucus)[
A ok(p) A ok(q) A p E caucus A q E caucus A V • caucus A ok(v)
D OMIC(r + 1, v2, caucus)(p)(y) = OMIC(r + 1, v2, caucus)(q)(y)
agree_ok_proof: Prove agree_ok from
C2 {r +- next_round(r)),
C2prop {r _ next_round(r), q +---y, v _-- v2},
C2prop {r +-- next_round(r), p #-- q, q _ y, v *-- v2}
all_ok_proof: Prove all_ok from
non_empty_ax {ml *- faulty_members(caucus)},
faulty_members {ml *-- caucus, z *- p}
Clprop_0: Lemma Clprop(0)
Clprop_O_proof: Prove Clprop_O from
Clprop {r _ 0},
OMO_ok {p _- p@pl, q _ y@pl, v _ v@pl, caucus +-- caucus@pl},
OMO_ok {p *-- q@pl, q ,-- y@pl, v *---v@pl, caucus _-- caucus@pl},
all_ok {p *-- y@pl, caucus +- caucus@p1},
nat_invariant {nat_var _--]fautty_members(caucus@pl)[}
Clprop__r: Lemma r < m A Clprop(r) D Clprop(r + 1)
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Clprop_r_proof: Prove Clprop_r from
Clprop
{v _-- vl@p3,
y _ z@p3,
p _-- p@p2,
q _ q@p2,
caucus *---caucus@p2- {y@p2}},
Clprop {r _- next_round(r)},
agree_nok
{v2 _'- v@p2,
caucus +-- caucus@p2,
p _ p@p2,
q _ q@p2,
y +-- y@p2},
agree_ok
{v2 _ v@p2,
caucus +-- caucus@p2,
p *" p@p2,
q _ q@p2,
y _ y@p2},
remove_others {p *---p@p2, q _-- y@p2, caucus *---caucus@p2},
remove_others {p _-- q@p2, q +- y@p2, caucus _-- caucus@p2},
card_remove_ax {ml *---caucus@p2, z _-- y@p2},
faulty-members_card_remove..nok {rnl _ caucus@p2, z +- y@p2}
Cl_proof: Prove C1 from
round_induct {round_prop ,- Clprop, s _ r},
Clprop_O,
Clprop..r {r _-- r@pl}
Cl_final_proof: Prove Cl_final from
C1 {r _ m}, Clprop {r _ rn, caucus _ fullset}, fullset_card_ax, mn_prop
C2_final_proof: Prove C2_final from
C2 {r _ m}, C2prop { v *-- m, caucus +-- fullset}, funset_card_ax, ran_prop
End consensus
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C.2 Proof-Chain Analysis
The following pages reproduce the output from the EItDM proof-chain analyzer in
"terse mode" applied to the formula ¢l_2inal in module consensus. The analysis
for C2Ainal is similar. The EHDM proof-chain analyzer examines the macroscopic
structure of a verification--checking that all the premises used in a proof are either
axioms, definitions, or formulas which are, themselves, the target of a successful
proof elsewhere in the verification. If any formulas are used from a module having
an assuming clause, then the proof-chain analyzer checks that those assumptions
are discharged by successful proofs; similarly, if formulas are used from a module
having a TCC module, then the proof-chain analyzer checks that all the TCCs in
that module are discharged by successful proofs. The proof-chain analyzer ignores
unsuccessful proofs (such as automaticaily-generated TCC proofs) when a successful
proof for the same formula can be found. The "terse mode" output reproduced here
provides a commentary on only the "interesting" cases, namely proof obligations
involving assuming clauses and TCCs, and a summary. All the proofs listed in the
summary were performed by the EHDM theorem prover in "checking mode."
Terse proof chain for formula Cl_final in module consensus
Interesting cases from the analysis follow; see summary for status
Use of the formula
consensus[EXPR, EXPR].C1_final
requires the following TCCs to be proven
consensus_tcc[EXPR, EXPR].processors_TCC1
consensus_tcc [EXPR
consensus_%cc [EXPR
cons ensus_% cc [EXPR
consensus_¢cc [EXPR
consensus tcc[EXPR
consensus_tcc[EXPR
consensus_tcc[EXPR
consensus_tcc[EXPR
consensus_tcc[EXPR
consensus_tcc[EXPR
consensus_tcc[EXPR
consensus_tcc[EXPR
consensus_tcc[EXPR
consensus_tcc [EXPR
consensus_tcc[EXPR,
consensus_tcc[EXPR,
consensus_tcc[EXPR,
consensus_tcc[EXPR,
EXPRJ.rounds_TCC1
EXPRJ.ON_TCCI
EXPR].ON_TCC2
EXPRJ.CI_finaI_TCCl
EXPRJ.round_induct_TCC1
EXPRJ.round_induct_TCC2
EXPRJ.round_induct_proof_TCC1
EXPR].round_induct_proof_TCC2
EXPR].OMO_prop_TCCI
EXPR].OM_prop_TCCI
EXPR].OMO_ok_TCCI
EXPRJ.ok_others_TCCl
EXPR].next_round_TCC1
EXPR].C2prop_r_TCCI
EXPR].agree_nok_TCCl
EXPR].agree_ok_TCCl
EXPR].Clprop_r_TCCI
EXPRj.Cl_fina1_proof_TCCl
Use of the formula
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induction.limited_induction
requires the following TCCs to be proven
induction_tcc.ind_m_proof_TCCi
Use of the formula
noetherian[naturalnumber, induction.prev].general_induction
requires the following assumptions to be discharged
noetherian[naturalnumber, induction.prev].well_founded
SUMMARY
The proof chain is complete
The axioms
consensus[EXPR
consensus[EXPR
consensus[EXPR
consensus[EXPR
consensus[EXPR
consensus[EXPR
consensus[EXPR
and assumptions at the base are:
EXPR].card_remove_ax
EXPR].fullset_card_ax
EXPR].maj_ext
EXPR].majax
EXPR].mn_prop
EXPR].non_empty_ax
EXPR].send_ax
functionprops[EXPR, EXPR].extensionality
noetherian[EXPR, EXPR].general_induction
Total: 9
The definitions and type-constraints are:
consensus[EXPR, EXPR].CIprop
consensus[EXPR, EXPR].C2prop
consensus[EXPR, EXPR].OM
consensus[EXPR, EXPR].faulty_members
naturalnumbers.nat_invariant
Total: B
The formulae used
consensus [EXPR
cons ensus [EXPR
consensus [EXPR
consensus [EXPR
consensus [EXPR
consensus [EXPR
consensus [EXPR
consensus [EXPR
consensus [EXPR
consensus [EXPR
consensus [EXPR
consensus [EXPR
are:
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
.Cl
.Ci_final
.Ciprop_O
.Ciprop_r
C2
C2prop_O
C2prop_r
OMO_ok
OMO_prop
OM_prop
agree_nok
agree_ok
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consensus
consensus
consensus
consensus
consensus
consensus
consensus
consensus
consensus
[EXPR
[EXPR
[EXPR
[EXPR
[EXPR
[EXPR
[EXPR
[EXPR
[EXPR
consensus[EXPR
consensus[EXPR
consensus[EXPR
consensus[EXPR,
consensus_tcc[EXPR
consensus_tcc[EXPR
consensus_tcc[EXPR
consensus_tcc[EXPR
consensus_tcc[EXPR
consensus_tcc[EXPR
consensus_tcc[EXPR
consensus_tcc[EXPR
consensus_tcc[EXPR
consensus_tcc[EXPR
consensus_tcc[EXPR
consensus_tcc[EXPR
consensus_tcc[EXPR
consensus_¢cc[EXPR
consensus_tcc[EXPR
consensus_tcc[EXPR
consensus_tcc[EXPR
consensus_tcc[EXPR
consensus_tcc[EXPR
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
.all_ok
.distr_prop
.faulty_members_card_remove_nok
.faulty_members_card_remove_ok
.ok_card_remove
.ok_others
.ok_self
.remove_nok
.remove_nok_member
.remove_ok
.remove_ok_member
.remove_others
.round_induct
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
ZXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
Cl_final_TCCl
Cl_final_proof_TCC1
CIprop_r_TCCI
C2prop_r_TCCl
OMO_ok_TCC1
OMO_prop_TCC1
OM_TCC1
ON_TCC2
OM_prop_TCC1
agree_nok_TCCl
agree_ok_TCC1
next_round_TCC1
ok_others_TCCl
processors_TCC1
round_induct_TCCl
round_induct_TCC2
round_induct_proof_TCC1
round_induct_proof_TCC2
rounds_TCC1
induction.basic_induction
induction.induction_m
induction.limited_induction
induction_tcc.ind_m_proof_TCC1
noetherian[naturalnumber, induction.prev].well_founded
Total: 49
The completed proofs are:
consensus[EXPR
consensus[EXPR
consensus[EXPR
consensus[EXPR
consensus[EXPR
consensus[EXPR
EXPR].Cl_final_proof
EXPR].Cl_proof
EXPR].Clprop_O_proof
EXPR].C1prop_r_proof
EXPR].C2_proof
EXPR].C2prop_0_proof
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consensus [EXPR,
consensus [EXPR,
consensus [EXPR,
consensus [EXPR,
consensus [EXPR,
consensus [EXPR,
cons ensus [EXPR,
consensus [EXPR,
cons ensus [EXPR
consensus [EXPR
cons ensus [EXPR
consensus [EXPR
cons ensus [EXPR
consensus [EXPR
cons ensus [EXPR
consensus [EXPR,
consensus [EXPR,
consensus [EXPR,
consensus [EXPR,
cons ensus_t cc [EXPR,
cons ensus_t cc [EXPR,
consensus_tcc [EXPR,
consensus_tcc [EXPR
consensus_t cc [EXPR
consensus_tcc [EXPR
cons ensus_t c c [EXPR
consensus_tcc [EXPR
consensus_tcc [EXPR
consensus_tcc [EXPR,
consensus_tcc [EXPR
consensus_tcc [EXPR
consensus_tcc [EXPR
consensus_tcc [EXPR
consensus_tcc [EXPR
cons ensus_% c c [EXPR
consensus_tcc [EXPR
induct ion. dis charge
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
EXPR]
.C2prop_r_proof
ONO_ok_proof
OMO_prop_proof
OM_prop_proof
agree_nok_proof
agree_ok_proof
all_ok_proof
.distr_prop_proof
.faulty_members_card_remove_nok_proof
.faulty_members_card_remove_ok_proof
.ok_card_remove_proof
.ok_others_proof
.ok_self_proof
.remove_nok_member_proof
.remove_nok_proof
.remove_ok_member_proof
.remove_ok_proof
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